

*Liability Management with  
Inflation-linked Products:  
The case of Sweden, France and Italy*

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In the Swedish case, Lars Hörngren and Erik Zetterström show that seen in retrospect, the government has recorded substantial savings from the issuance of inflation-linked debt. The primary reason is that average inflation has been below the level expected when large parts of the stock were issued. However, as for the UK, they note that over the recent period the diversification benefits of inflation-linked debt are more emphasised than their impact on the expected borrowing costs. They also explain that, although the arguments for issuing inflation-linked bonds were largely qualitative in nature, the decision in 2005 to set a target share of 20% for inflation-linked debt had also been preceded by formal analyses of the appropriate composition of the debt portfolio, including a set of stochastic simulation models. Hörngren and Zetterström review these models and, specifically, how they were set up to integrate inflation-linked debt in the analysis of the overall portfolio.

In the French case, Jean-Paul Renne and Nicolas Sagnes presents the quantitative methodology aimed at assessing the cost and risk

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
01 impact of a change in the share of inflation-indexed debt. They  
02 consider both interest cost and budget balance and use a wide  
03 range of econometric tools to model the French economy and the  
04 dynamics of budget balance. Based on this quantitative analysis,  
05 they come up with the following results: by saving the inflation  
06 risk premium, the government can lower the average debt service  
07 when increasing the share of indexed debt, but if the increase is  
08 strong, it also makes the debt service more variable. However, the  
09 conclusion is also that, starting from 0%, increasing indexed debt  
10 up to a moderate level (around 20%) would lead to a decrease  
11 in expected interest payments without significantly increasing the  
12 variability of the budget balance.

13 In the Italian case, Davide Iacovoni describes the process behind  
14 the Italian Treasury's decision to start issuing inflation-linked bonds  
15 in 2003. It emerges that the decision was based on a comprehensive  
16 evaluation, which took into account both pure debt management  
17 considerations and market aspects. Iacovoni recounts the Treasury's  
18 experience in placing these bonds; the evolution of the secondary  
19 market since 2003, in terms of both type of trades and investors  
20 involved, and the linkers' building programme. The second part of  
21 the section is devoted to the models adopted by the Treasury to  
22 assess the optimal issuance policy on linkers in quantitative terms.  
23 Iacovoni highlights the pros and cons of the different models as well  
24 as their internal consistency and capacity to fit actual market data,  
25 thereby enabling the reader to understand the reasons underlying  
26 the Treasury's actions to improve the analytical framework adopted  
27 to support issuance and debt management decisions on linkers.

## 28 **LIABILITY MANAGEMENT WITH INFLATION-LINKED** 29 **PRODUCTS: THE CASE OF SWEDEN**

31 The Swedish central government started issuing inflation-linked  
32 bonds in 1994. The justification at the time included the fact that  
33 the issuer should be able to borrow more cheaply by avoiding  
34 the inflation premium in nominal bonds and that the government  
35 could signal its commitment to low inflation by assuming long-term  
36 inflation risk. Since this was a period with very high borrowing  
37 needs, a broadening of the investor base and reduced reliance  
38 on nominal instruments were seen as additional advantages from  
39 adding a new type of debt to the portfolio.

Figure 22.1 Inflation-linked debt



The figure uses the conventional measure of debt. Based on the measure used in the government's guidelines, the share reached the target of 25% at the end of 2007<sup>1</sup>

The programme started slowly, but from 1996 and onwards the issuance of inflation-linked debt took off. Since its introduction, the share of inflation-linked debt has grown consistently; cf, Figure 22.1. Neither the introduction nor the expansion was preceded by much formal analysis. When comprehensive annual guidelines for government debt management were introduced in Sweden in 1998, the issue of the appropriate share for inflation-linked debt was left open, pending further analysis. However, the government instructed the Swedish National Debt Office (SNDO) to gradually increase the share, based on the presumption that the analysis would show that the share ought to be higher than the level at the time.

The guidelines were formulated in the same way until 2005 when the government set a percentage target of 20%. By then, the justification for inflation-linked debt had been modified. The guidelines now emphasised the value of having an additional debt class in the portfolio, ie, diversification rather than lower expected borrowing costs.<sup>2</sup>

Seen in retrospect, the Swedish government has recorded substantial savings from the issuance of inflation-linked debt. The primary reason is that average inflation has been below the level expected when large parts of the stock were issued, partly because

01 there was a period in the 1990s when the official inflation target was  
02 not seen as credible. In recent years, the breakeven inflation rate  
03 has hovered at or even below the official inflation target.<sup>3</sup> There  
04 is scant evidence for an inflation risk premium. If there is one, it  
05 tends to be offset by a liquidity premium. All in all, it is reasonable  
06 to assume that the expected cost of inflation-linked debt is similar  
07 to that of nominal debt. It is when something unexpected happens  
08 that inflation-linked debt will make a difference. To this end, you  
09 need models that can help you understand and illustrate the effects  
10 of uncertainty.

11 Although the arguments for issuing inflation-linked bonds were  
12 largely qualitative in nature, the decision to set a target share of  
13 20% had also been preceded by formal analyses of the appropriate  
14 composition of the debt portfolio, including a set of stochastic  
15 simulation models. The purpose of this section is to review these  
16 models and, specifically, how they were set up to integrate inflation-  
17 linked debt in the analysis of the overall portfolio. The final sub-  
18 section summarises the lessons we have learnt and points to some  
19 important outstanding issues.


## 21 **Quantitative modelling of inflation-linked bonds**

### 22 *A stochastic macro-based simulation model*

23 The SNDO's first attempt to model inflation-linked bonds in a con-  
24 sistent quantitative manner is presented in Bergström *et al* (2002).  
25 The model has two parts. The first is a stochastic simulation model  
26 capable of generating paths for key macroeconomic and financial  
27 variables, including GDP, inflation, exchange rates and real and  
28 nominal interest rates. The second part is a debt strategy simulation  
29 model. This uses the simulated paths for the macro and financial  
30 variables as inputs to calculate the costs and risks of given portfolio  
31 strategies. The resulting cost and risk measures can be used for  
32 quantitative assessments of the characteristics of various portfolio  
33 strategies.

34 The macro model is intended to be simple and intuitive, since a  
35 non-intuitive model typically will fail to inform (or impress) policy  
36 makers. At the technical level the model has two key features.  
37 First, variables are assumed to follow stationary autoregressive  
38 processes. Second, the autoregressive processes of some variables  
39

Figure 22.2 The macro simulation model



are allowed to vary over the business cycle, ie, they are state-dependent in the sense that they follow different processes depending on whether the economy is in boom or recession. The latter state variable is in turn governed by a stochastic transition process, known as a two-state Markov chain.

The linkages in the model are depicted in Figure 22.2. Without going into the details of the specification, the picture illustrates that even a simplified macro model tends to become quite complex.

The strategy simulation model tracks and controls the portfolio in a fairly detailed manner. It determines, in each step of the simulation, how much should be issued in each debt category, as well as the maturity distribution in each category, for the financing requirement to be met and the portfolio to satisfy the criteria for the given portfolio strategy. It also computes the cost of the chosen portfolio in each period, given the interest rates, etc, generated by the macro model.

In the version presented in the 2002 guideline proposal, we used the model to generate 1,000 simulated paths over 30-year periods.

01 We analysed nine portfolio strategies, with distinct differences in  
02 portfolio shares and time to maturity.

03 At the technical level, inflation-linked debt is modelled in the  
04 same way as foreign currency debt in that the price level functions  
05 analogously to the exchange rate when computing the realised cost  
06 in (nominal) domestic currency terms. A key feature of the model  
07 is that the inflation rate is endogenous. It goes without saying that  
08 the way in which inflation is modelled is crucial for the simulation  
09 results. In this case, it is assumed that the domestic central bank  
10 meets its inflation target on average.

11 This reflects a more general characteristic of a simulation model  
12 of this type: it is necessary to assure that the key variables in the  
13 macro model are stationary. If not, paths that are both economically  
14 and politically unsustainable would arise. In the real world, such  
15 severe strains on the economy often result in drastic policy mea-  
16 sures, including fundamental regime changes. However, it is hard  
17 to include such reactions in a quantitative model since they will  
18 tend to affect the structural relationships between key variables.<sup>4</sup>  
19 Hence, the economy described by the model is inherently well-  
20 behaved.

21 This has several implications for the simulation results. First,  
22 portfolio strategies are not tested in extreme circumstances, eg,  
23 when the borrowing requirement explodes and debt grows along  
24 an unsustainable path for an extended period. Second, and related  
25 to inflation-linked debt, it means that, although there is some vari-  
26 ability over time in inflation, and thus in the cost of inflation-linked  
27 relative to nominal debt, the differences are small. As a result, and  
28 despite attempts to measure variability (risk) both across states and  
29 along simulated paths, the model is not able to yield quantitatively  
30 significant differences between nominal and inflation-linked debt.

31 To summarise, the stochastic macro-based model gave several  
32 useful insights overall, but, as regards the role of inflation-linked  
33 debt, it did not help to determine the appropriate share of inflation-  
34 linked debt in the Swedish government debt portfolio.

35  
36 *A stochastic simulation model of inflation, interest rates and*  
37 *exchange rates*

38 The second attempt to coax something useful out of a simulation  
39 model was launched in 2006 when the Swedish government asked

01 the SNDO to analyse, and propose, a comprehensive maturity  
02 benchmark for the whole of the central government debt (earlier  
03 only the nominal debt and the foreign currency debt were included  
04 in the maturity benchmark).<sup>5</sup> A benchmark for the maturity of  
05 the whole debt was seen as desirable since it would increase the  
06 possibilities to consider refinancing and refixing risks in nominal  
07 and inflation-linked debt jointly.

08 Having realised that it is tricky to get answers out of full-  
09 fledged macro-based stochastic models where everything depends  
10 on everything else in a (somewhat) realistic manner, the SNDO  
11 decided to take a step back and skip the structural macro part of the  
12 model. The second model therefore focuses on possible future paths  
13 for inflation and financial variables, ie, interest rates and exchange  
14 rates, without explicit links to a model economy. The interaction  
15 between variables is also kept on a more tractable level. Instead of  
16 modelling the interplay between variables within a macroeconomic  
17 model, we introduce covariance between inflation, interest rates  
18 and exchange rates via the disturbance terms in the stochastic  
19 processes.

20 Aside from having a cruder macro setup, the 2006 model retains  
21 the two-part structure of the earlier model. That is, it consists  
22 of one part that generates paths for variables affecting costs and  
23 another part where we try a number of debt strategies. The focus on  
24 debt maturity (more specifically the risk associated with different  
25 maturity targets) in this application led us to parameterise the  
26 model in a way that makes it – on average – as expensive to use  
27 inflation-linked debt as domestic or foreign currency debt.<sup>6</sup>

28 Following the example of the earlier model, variables follow sta-  
29 tionary autoregressive processes.<sup>7</sup> However, the two-state Markov  
30 chain specification is dropped in an attempt to further simplify the  
31 model. Instead, extra attention compared with the earlier model is  
32 paid to the modelling of the yield curves.

33 Yield curves, both domestic and foreign, are estimated with  
34 a method put forward by Diebold and Li (2006). They model  
35 the entire yield curve as a three-dimensional parameter evolving  
36 dynamically. Furthermore, they assume that the three dimensions,  
37 interpreted as the level, slope and curvature of a yield curve, can be  
38 estimated with autoregressive models.

01           The costs of inflation-linked debt and foreign currency debt are  
02 modelled in the spirit of the 2002 model. That is, simulated paths of  
03 inflation and exchange rates are used to calculate costs in nominal  
04 domestic currency terms. However, variations on the theme are  
05 adopted.

06           In the 2002 model, gains and losses stemming from innovations  
07 in inflation and exchange rates are – aside from their effect on  
08 coupon payments – only considered for loans that mature or are  
09 repurchased during the period. That is, we employ a cashflow-  
10 based measure of cost.

11           The 2006 model uses two different cost measures: one where  
12 the effects of exchange rate and inflation innovations are used to  
13 revalue coupon payments and the total stock of outstanding debt,  
14 and one where such innovations are considered to affect coupon  
15 payments only. These measures can be seen as two extremes. In  
16 the first measure, value changes (ie, gains and losses) are registered  
17 on the day they occur. In the second measure, we skip revaluation  
18 effects on the outstanding – and maturing – debt altogether since  
19 innovations will even out in the long run and hence do not affect  
20 long-run costs (remember that mean reversion characterises the  
21 relevant variables).

22           Since the risk inherent in a given strategy is defined as the  
23 variability in costs stemming from that strategy, it should come  
24 as no surprise that the results to a large extent depend on which  
25 measure we use.

26           To be more precise, the risk measure (the risk of a strategy) in the  
27 model is defined as the difference between the 95th and the 50th  
28 percentile in the simulated cost distributions, of which there is one  
29 for each debt category and time step.

30           In the simulations we generate 20,000 paths for the state vari-  
31 ables; the simulation horizon was kept at 30 years. At each time  
32 step – one year – we calculate the cost and risk that is associated  
33 with a debt of a certain maturity.

34           Plenty of interesting, and directly useful, conclusions could be  
35 drawn from the exercises. We find – with one exception – that risk  
36 decreases with time to maturity and increases the longer into the  
37 future we look. More importantly, we find that the marginal risk  
38 reduction decreases rapidly as maturity is extended, indicating that  
39 there is no reason to go very long.



01 It is also readily evident that what one believes to be the relevant  
02 cost measure is vital for perceived riskiness of a debt strategy. If  
03 we include the effect on outstanding volumes (stock effects) of  
04 innovations in inflation and exchange rates, the foreign currency  
05 debt is considerably more risky than inflation-linked debt, which  
06 in turn is riskier than nominal domestic currency debt. This risk  
07 ranking changes markedly if we assume that stock revaluation  
08 effects are unimportant; in this case, foreign currency debt (if it  
09 is split between several currencies) and inflation-linked debt are  
10 instead less risky than domestic currency debt. One key conclusion  
11 (the exception mentioned above) from the simulation exercise –  
12 and one that was directly transferred to actual policy – was that  
13 a maturity-risk trade-off is not apparent in the foreign currency  
14 debt if one also considers the stock effect. Since exchange rate  
15 innovations swamped the refixing risk, we found foreign currency  
16 debt to be (essentially) equally risky regardless of time to maturity.  
17 This finding led the SNDO to shorten the maturity of the foreign  
18 currency debt considerably.

## 20 **Conclusions**

21 Stochastic simulation models are a useful tool for government debt  
22 portfolio analyses. However, they do not provide all the answers.  
23 In particular, it is difficult to use such models to test how a debt  
24 strategy fares in a deep crisis. This is a significant limitation, since  
25 it is in crises that debt policy may matter the most. Moreover, in a  
26 benign environment, nominal or inflation-linked debt makes little  
27 difference, whereas debt costs will behave quite differently in a  
28 crisis involving high inflation or deflation depending on whether  
29 the portfolio has a significant share of inflation-linked debt.

30  
31 To capture such effects, stochastic simulation models should  
32 be complemented by scenario-based models. The SNDO has also  
33 developed such a model.<sup>8</sup> It is designed for stress testing, ie, to  
34 see how severe but relatively short-term events that radically alter  
35 financial variables or the borrowing needs affect debt costs. By  
36 comparing the steady-state costs and the costs during the crisis  
37 event, one also gets a measure of the cost of using a particular  
38 portfolio as a means to insure against the harmful effects of the  
39 shock.

01           The SNDO's modelling work and other attempts to provide a  
02 coherent basis for government debt management have also pointed  
03 to limitations in our understanding of the meaning of "cost" and  
04 "risk", the key concepts on which the objective of debt management  
05 is based.


06           First, financial risk is ultimately related to the interplay between  
07 liabilities and assets. The inclusion of GDP as an endogenous state  
08 variable in the macro-based simulation is a step in the direction of  
09 capturing the key asset of a sovereign borrower, namely, the right  
10 to tax income and production. However, it is obvious that GDP  
11 is but a crude proxy for the true assets of a sovereign. It is also  
12 noteworthy that even this rough specification of the links between  
13 the macroeconomy and the state of government finances makes the  
14 model quite complex. It appears that a solid approach to sovereign  
15 asset and liability management remains an illusive goal.

16           Second, there are questions outstanding regarding the proper  
17 measures of cost. Inevitably, this also affects the perception of risk,  
18 since risk must be linked to (unexpected) variability in a relevant  
19 measure of cost. Possibly, the lack of clarity is related to the previ-  
20 ous point. In the absence of a truly consistent overall framework,  
21 it is hard to be very precise about cost measures. In some circum-  
22 stances it may be correct to ignore revaluation effects; in others  
23 it may be necessary to include full mark-to-market costs. Given  
24 this uncertainty, it may be necessary to pay attention to several  
25 different measures of cost and risk. This complicates the analysis  
26 and the decision process, but it would be misleading to pretend that  
27 government debt policy is an uncomplicated area.  
28

### 29           **LIABILITY MANAGEMENT WITH INFLATION-LINKED** 30           **PRODUCTS: THE FRENCH APPROACH**

31           In December 1997, the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Indus-  
32 try announced plans to issue in 1998 an inflation-indexed bond. The  
33 Act of July 2, 1998 authorised indexation of financial products to  
34 inflation, enabling France to launch on September 15, 1998 the first  
35 inflation-indexed bond in the Euro area (the 3% January 2009 OATi).  
36 In 2001, the Minister decided to issue the first OAT indexed on the  
37 euro area harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) (excluding  
38 tobacco). This decision was intended to forward the development of  
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Figure 22.3 Market turnover in French government inflation-linked bonds




the European market for inflation-indexed bonds. Since then, OATi-€i have become an integral part of government issuing policy. At the end of 2007, around 14% of total debt outstanding was indexed. Supported by a significant demand, liquidity in inflation-indexed bonds has experienced a strong increase since the early 2000s (see Figure 22.3).<sup>9</sup>

In 2005, Agence France Trésor developed a methodology, based on the so-called dynamic financial analysis (eg, Bolder (2002, 2003) or Black and Telmer (1999)), aimed at assessing the cost and risk impact of a change in the share of inflation-indexed debt (Renne and Sagnes 2006). Although the following results are broadly based on the same approach, the model has been slightly modified since then and it has also been re-estimated using the latest available data. The macro-finance model is further used to stochastically simulate future economic scenarios. The application of the strategies under the scenarios results in probability distribution for debt service series from which cost and risk measures are derived, for each strategy. This methodology is applied to compare strategies involving different shares of indexed debt. The main results are the following: by saving the inflation risk premium, the government can lower the average debt service when increasing the share of indexed debt, but, if the increase is strong, it also makes the debt service more variable. However, our simulations tend to show

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**Figure 22.4** Model structure



that, starting from 0%, increasing indexed debt up to a moderate level (around 20%) would lead to a decrease in expected interest payments without significantly increasing the variability of the budget balance.

**The stochastic simulation framework**

The model is composed of several blocks, the organisation of which is presented on Figure 22.4. The “core” block depicts the dynamics of key macroeconomic and financial variables: GDP growth, inflation, the three-month interest rate and the interest rate spread (10 years to three months).<sup>10</sup> There are two additional blocks, dealing respectively with the yield curve and the primary deficit dynamics. The model includes six nominal bonds with maturities of three months, one year, two years, five years, 10 years and 30 years and two inflation-linked bonds with maturities of 10 and 30 years.

Two alternative econometric modelling approaches are used for the main block (referred to as the core model below): a simple vector auto regression (VAR) and a Markov-switching VAR (MSVAR). Both models are estimated using quarterly data spanning the period 1986Q1–2007Q1.<sup>11</sup>

Introduced by Sims (1980), VARs have been extensively used in macroeconomics. For Stock and Watson (2001), the VAR remains a useful tool for analysing and forecasting time series. It is common knowledge that VARs replicate more satisfyingly the dynamics of

01 time series in comparison with calibrated dynamic general stochas-  
 02 tic equilibrium (DSGE) models.

03 The use of Markov-switching models in macroeconomics has  
 04 been widely developed following Hamilton (1989), who uses  
 05 Markov chains to introduce latent variables indicating growth and  
 06 recession periods. Krolzig (1997) applies such models in a multi-  
 07 variate context. In our case, this method is expected to efficiently  
 08 capture – and further to enable the simulation of – two regimes.  
 09 While one of them corresponds to periods with stronger nominal  
 10 rate of interest and growth, the other corresponds to periods with  
 11 lower means for these variables. In this context, some of the changes  
 12 that were attributed to strong and persistent shocks in the simple  
 13 VAR case then appear to result from regime switches (eg, Garcia  
 14 and Perron (1996)). Besides, the yield curve appears to be more  
 15 volatile in the first regime than in the second one, as is suggested  
 16 by the variances of the short rate and the slope of the yield curve.

17 The primary deficit is split into a cyclical and a structural compo-  
 18 nent. In an attempt to estimate the part of public deficit accounted  
 19 for by cyclical fluctuations, Van den Noord (2000) assesses the  
 20 elasticities of public income and expenses to the economic cycle.<sup>12</sup>  
 21 A report dealing with public finances in the Eurozone (European  
 22 Commission 2002) underlines the consensus about the 0.5 value for  
 23 the elasticity of the cyclical deficit to the cycle, as measured by the  
 24 output gap. Therefore, the cyclical primary deficit (in percentage of  
 25 GDP) is simply taken to be equal to half the output gap. For its part,  
 26 the primary structural deficit is finally modelled by a basic AR(1).

27 While the simulation approach requires the derivation of the  
 28 whole yield curve in order to satisfyingly depict debt managing  
 29 tools, only two points are provided by the core model (three months  
 30 and 10 years). An extrapolation procedure has therefore to be  
 31 implemented. Using a parametric form inspired by the Nelson and  
 32 Siegel (1987) model, the par yield for a maturity  $m$  bond is given by  
 33 a Laguerre polynomial:

$$34 \quad y_t^m = \beta_{0,t} + (\beta_{1,t} + \beta_2) \frac{\tau}{m} (1 - e^{-m/\tau}) - \beta_2 e^{-m/\tau}$$

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 37 This model can be seen as a two-factor model ( $\beta_{0,t}$  and  $\beta_{1,t}$ ). Since  
 38 the yields are linear combinations of these two factors, each yield  
 39 of the curve is a linear combination of any two other distinct yields.

01 This is an attractive feature of the model since it allows you to get  
02 the whole yield curve by knowing the two yields modelled by the  
03 core model.<sup>13</sup> This method is very basic compared with the two  
04 popular approaches to term structure modelling, namely the no-  
05 arbitrage models and the equilibrium models. Nevertheless, it still  
06 appears to be relevant in view of the good fit it provides and since  
07 our objective is more to build a model able to reproduce closely the  
08 dynamics of the series rather than to develop a general equilibrium  
09 macro-finance model.

10 The real yield curve computation is based on the standard  
11 equation (eg, Barr and Pesaran (2000))  $r_t^m = y_t^m - be_t^m$  where  $be_t^m$   
12 is the breakeven inflation of maturity  $t + m$ , equal to the sum of  
13 the expected average annual inflation between periods  $t$  and  $t + m$   
14 and of a term resulting from differences existing between nominal  
15 and indexed bonds among which stands out the inflation risk  
16 premium.<sup>14</sup>

17 Faced with the absence of consensus regarding the estima-  
18 tion/modelling of the inflation risk premium, and also for parsimo-  
19 nious purposes, the model assumes that the risk premium is equal  
20 to 20 basis points (bp) and is constant over the simulation period.<sup>15</sup>

21 The financing strategies can be seen as reaction functions of the  
22 debt manager. Knowing the information available at time  $t$ , the debt  
23 manager has to choose how to spread the government financing  
24 requirements over the different available securities. The simplest  
25 conceivable strategy consists in issuing in each period the same  
26 proportion of each bond (defined by a vector  $\alpha$ ), but there is a  
27 problem of convergence for the debt composition. As illustrated in  
28 Bolder (2003), the previous strategy does not reach a stable debt  
29 composition as defined by  $\alpha$ . Bolder (2003) shows that the trick is  
30 to systematically replace the maturing bonds by ones having the  
31 same maturities. Moreover, the presence of inflation-indexed bonds  
32 also requires a specific treatment, as, when inflation-linked debt  
33 matures, the capital to be replaced is higher than for an equivalent  
34 nominal bond, because of inflation accrual.<sup>16</sup>

35 The model replicates the use of interest rate swaps in order to  
36 reach the targeted structure of the debt portfolio as soon as the  
37 first simulation period. Using combinations of swaps (mixing plain  
38 vanilla swaps with inflation-indexed swap in the present case), the  
39 issuer can indeed synthetically modify the debt structure so as

01 to instantaneously match the  $\alpha$  target. The structure is then kept  
02 constant over time by renewing these swaps at maturity.

#### 04 AN APPLICATION TO OPTIMAL SHARE OF INFLATION-LINKED 05 DEBT

06 This simulation framework is used to analyse the effects – in terms  
07 of cost and risk – of changes in the share of inflation-linked debt.  
08 The considered strategies differ along two directions: the share  
09 of inflation-indexed debt (between 0% and 40%) and the average  
10 maturity of the debt portfolio (between 5.5 and 7.5 years).<sup>17</sup> Insofar  
11 as the aim of the paper is to analyse the impact in terms of cost  
12 and risk of the share of inflation-indexed debt, the second direction  
13 may appear superfluous. Yet, it is interesting to the extent that it  
14 gives an idea of the room for cost minimisation offered by inflation-  
15 indexed debt compared with the more “classical” one stemming  
16 from decreases in duration.


17 Four risk measures have been considered. Two of them relate to  
18 interest payments in percentage of GDP and the other two relate to  
19 the budget balance in percentage of GDP (interest payments plus  
20 primary deficit). For each of these two variables (interest payments  
21 and budget balance), two risk measures, which do not depict the  
22 same kind of “variability”, are computed. More precisely, while the  
23 first – hereinafter referred to as volatility – corresponds to year-  
24 to-year variability, the second one – cost-at-risk – refers to lower-  
25 frequency variability.<sup>18</sup> Note that some financing strategies can be  
26 judged to be risky with respect to one of these measures and not  
27 risky with respect to the other one.<sup>19</sup>

28 After having applied the different strategies under the 10,000  
29 10-year scenarios, these are plotted in cost/risk planes. Figure 22.5  
30 presents the cost/risk planes resulting from MSVAR simulations.

31 On each cost/risk plane, five curves are plotted. Each curve  
32 contains strategies implying the same average debt maturity. On a  
33 given curve, the strategies differ according to the share of inflation-  
34 indexed debt they result in. The analysis of the shape of these curves  
35 suggests that a rise in the share of inflation-linked bonds has the  
36 following implications.

- 37  
38 (1) A decrease in the average debt interest payments, reflecting the  
39 existence of the inflation risk premium: an increase in the share

Figure 22.5 Simulation results: cost/risk planes, MSVAR model



of indexed debt of 40 percentage points yields a decrease in annual interest payments by around 0.05% of GDP. Naturally, this figure depends on the chosen inflation risk premium.<sup>20</sup>

- (2) An on a risk that depends on the chosen cost measure (interest cost or budget balance): we observe a rise in the volatility measure of annual interest payment charges. This risk measure increases more than twofold when the share of inflation-indexed debt passes from 0% to 40% (for both models, VAR and MSVAR). This can be accounted for by the additional volatility introduced in debt charges when more debt is indexed on inflation. However, it turns out that, starting from 0%, an increase in the share of inflation-indexed debt is efficient up to a threshold. Besides, this threshold tends to be higher when the variability of the budget balance is considered: it is close to 10% in this case (for both models) against 5% when the variability of interest payments is considered. Besides, it has to be noted that the rise in volatility is extremely limited – compared with the decrease in average cost – when the share of indexed debt grows but remains below 20% (especially regarding the budget balance variability).<sup>21</sup>



01 (3) Overall, it appears that a rise in the share of inflation-indexed  
02 debt results in a less – if any, depending on the risk measure –  
03 harmful impact in terms of budget balance variability than it  
04 has on sole interest payment variability: this gives support to  
05 the intuition that, to a certain extent, the covariances between  
06 payments of indexed bonds and cyclical variations of the pri-  
07 mary deficit can be exploited to hedge some shocks affecting  
08 public outlays. Besides, these results are fairly robust to the  
09 choice of the econometric model (VAR versus MSVAR). By  
10 comparing the different curves on each cost/risk plane (one  
11 curve stands for one given average debt maturity), one can  
12 observe that the previous results only slightly depend on the  
13 considered average maturity of debt.<sup>22</sup>

14  
15 As a result, according to these simulations, if one is more con-  
16 cerned with budget balance variability than with interest payments  
17 – consistently with tax smoothing objectives notably (eg, Barro  
18 (1979, 1999)) – and is starting from a large average debt maturity  
19 and from a low share of inflation-indexed debt, then one should  
20 increase the share of inflation-indexed debt (up to at least 10% ~  
21 20% if the main concern is with budget balance year-on-year change  
22 or even more if the main concern is with budget balance cost-at-  
23 risk).

## 24 **THE ITALIAN TREASURY'S EXPERIENCE WITH** 25 **INFLATION-LINKED BONDS**

26  
27 The Italian Treasury launched its inflation-linked bond program in  
28 2003 after having analysed and prepared this move for quite a long  
29 time. The previous experience with linkers was in 1983, 20 years  
30 before. It was not really a positive one: the choice of the inflation  
31 index, the GDP deflator, as well as its design, with annual coupon,  
32 were the main causes for its lukewarm reception by the market.

33 20 years later a completely different context allowed the Treasury  
34 to finally enter this market again as the reasons from a public  
35 debt management perspective and a wider economy policy one  
36 were all there. Issuing inflation-linked bonds was considered to be  
37 a social welfare improving policy as the State is among the few  
38 natural inflation receivers in the economy (through taxes) so it is  
39 also one of the few who can actually pay inflation. Given the latent

01 demand for inflation-protected assets in the system, offering them  
02 represented a way to provide the economy with a “public good”  
03 thereby “completing” markets.

04 But of course this was a necessary and not a sufficient condition  
05 for the Treasury to go ahead. From a pure public debt management  
06 perspective these bonds allow the issuer to move its efficient fron-  
07 tier towards the origin in the cost–risk space: by saving the inflation-  
08 risk premium components embedded in nominal rates, especially  
09 on longer maturities, and by reducing the volatility of the cost of  
10 debt in real terms, the diversification effect brought about by this  
11 new asset class could have been really significant. There are also  
12 additional benefits derived from the possibility of lightening the  
13 pressure on nominal bonds in terms of issuance volumes and at  
14 least partially contributing to the stabilisation of the debt/GDP  
15 ratio, as this ratio heavily depends on the real cost of debt.

16 Besides the analysis of the demand evolution, aimed at assessing  
17 the possibility of launching an actual “program” of inflation-linked  
18 securities and not so much a one-shot opportunistic issuance, two  
19 additional factors spurred the Treasury to the final decision: (i)  
20 the start of European Monetary Union, with its framework clearly  
21 aimed at keeping inflation low and stable and (ii) the rise of a sig-  
22 nificant structural demand for bonds linked to euro-area inflation.  
23 By choosing the same linker format – the so-called Canadian model  
24 – already chosen other large sovereign issuers such as France, USA  
25 and Canada, and by adopting the euro-area harmonized consumer  
26 price index (excluding tobacco) as the inflation reference, the Trea-  
27 sury was indeed able to satisfy the demand coming from a very  
28 large spectrum of investors and to pursue its goals in terms of  
29 issuance activity and the presence of this asset call within the total  
30 debt.

31 In almost five years (from September 2003 to June 2008) around  
32 87 billion euros of BTP€is have been placed in the market both  
33 through auctions and syndications. Given the commitment clearly  
34 shown by the Treasury to keep the pace of issuance more regular  
35 and stable, the appeal of these bonds has steadily grown. Not only  
36 have most of the outstanding bonds been placed abroad (normally  
37 between 70% and 80% of each placement through syndication has  
38 been allotted to non-Italian investors, since the first transaction  
39 in September 03), but also the base of investors has significantly

01 developed over time. Initially demand came mostly from banks  
02 and dealers interested in hedging the inflation exposure they had  
03 entered into by issuing retail tailored inflation structured products;  
04 then insurance companies and pension funds become more active  
05 by hedging liabilities linked to inflation. More recently relative  
06 value players (hedge funds and other accounts of leveraged type)  
07 have become increasingly present in the sector as the liquidity of  
08 the bonds has definitively improved and the inflation swap market  
09 has taken off significantly.

10 Trading these bonds versus conventional ones (on a breakeven  
11 inflation basis) versus other linkers or against swap has indeed  
12 become increasingly feasible at a lesser cost, thereby attracting new  
13 and sophisticated players in the market. The Treasury over time has  
14 followed these developments by shaping its program accordingly,  
15 in order to continue to achieve its goals in terms of cost and risk. In  
16 this respect, new maturities have been introduced and an adequate  
17 mix of flexibility (in terms of bonds to be offered each time) and  
18 regularity (in terms of issuance frequency and final volume to be  
19 reached by each bond) has been adopted in an effort to address the  
20 spontaneous evolution of the market.

### 21 **Assessing the optimal issuance strategy on linkers**

22 Even before launching its program the Treasury focused on existing  
23 models aimed at implementing a strategy that could maximise the  
24 benefits (or a subset of them) of including linkers in the total central  
25 government marketable debt.  
26

27 Since 2002 the Treasury has analytically studied the link between  
28 the government budget and the main macroeconomic variables,  
29 such as real growth and inflation. As far as inflation is concerned,  
30 a positive and statistically significant relation was found between  
31 this variable and the strictly automatic component of the budget: a  
32 shock to inflation in a given year translates into a higher primary  
33 budget in the same year and in the following four years on the base  
34 of specific coefficients (so-called semi-elasticities). Therefore, even  
35 if obvious and known from a pure theoretical ground, the study  
36 (Maggi *et al* 2005) fully validated the status of the government as a  
37 natural inflation payer, being an inflation receiver through taxes,  
38 and to some extent it provided the Treasury with a very useful  
39 insight to quantify the sensitivity of the public budget to inflation.

01           However, this kind of approach could not be a practical tool to  
02 assess the optimal issuance strategy: first of all inflation was found  
03 to be steadily and clearly correlated with the part of the primary bal-  
04 ance represented by items that by definition tend to automatically  
05 move with macroeconomic variables; with respect to the whole  
06 primary budget, including those items that are set discretionarily  
07 by the government each year, the relation was much less stable and  
08 significant. Even if this result was in no way undermining the above  
09 conclusion in which the government is actually a natural inflation  
10 receiver, assessing how much larger is the natural inflation hedge  
11 coming from tax revenues in the medium- to long-term perspective  
12 remained an open issue that was difficult to solve. Moreover, decid-  
13 ing on the volumes of linkers to be placed in the market only on the  
14 basis of the “inflation capacity” of the budget is considered to be  
15 not exhaustive even within a deficit smoothing approach (Missale  
16 2001): according to this approach the optimal share of inflation-  
17 indexed paper should be set according to the sign and level of  
18 covariances among the main macroeconomic variables affecting the  
19 government budget (real interest rates, GDP real growth, inflation  
20 and so on). However, this policy recommendation has turned out  
21 to be rather difficult to implement because, in particular, these  
22 covariances are not stable over time, which is a feature that does  
23 not fit with the characteristics of the Italian Government debt, as its  
24 size does not allow for rapid and large changes in its composition.

25           In parallel with the deficit smoothing approach, the issue regard-  
26 ing how to assess the optimal strategy on linkers has also been  
27 analysed within the traditional cost–risk portfolio theory approach  
28 and more recently within the optimal control approach that the  
29 Treasury has also adopted since 2004.<sup>23</sup> This last approach relies on  
30 a cost of debt function based on the generation of several interest  
31 rate scenarios: since the introduction of inflation-linked bonds for  
32 each generated nominal yield curve scenario, the model generates  
33 a consistent breakeven inflation curve scenario. In a first period  
34 this was achieved through a “backward looking” model whereby  
35 European inflation rate and the European Central Bank (ECB) repo  
36 rate were linked through a response function: on the basis of histor-  
37 ical data, the user could introduce into the model several evolution  
38 paths for European inflation and automatically generate as many  
39 correspondent (and consistent with the past) ECB rate paths. No

01 particular assumption was made about differences in the evolution  
02 of the actual inflation rate and breakeven inflation rate, nor was a  
03 term structure for breakeven inflation rates introduced.

04 The model was then dramatically improved by adopting a value-  
05 at-risk approach whereby the term structure of nominal rates and  
06 breakeven inflation rates, the short term interest rate and the  
07 European inflation rate were generated through a system of struc-  
08 tural equations of the economy with some exogenous constraints  
09 introduced in order to take into account stylised facts emerging  
10 from time series of these variables (such as a lower volatility of  
11 real interest rates than nominal and an almost linear shape of the  
12 breakeven term structure). However, when the VaR model was  
13 calibrated with more recent data (from 2007 onwards) some of  
14 its matrices did not fulfill some necessary conditions (mainly to  
15 be definite positive): this showed that the fit of the model with  
16 actual data was not satisfactory, especially if the abovementioned  
17 constraints had to hold.  
18

19 The current version of the model is quite different from that of  
20 the past in the way nominal interest rates and breakeven inflation  
21 rate are now generated. The nominal yield curves are now gen-  
22 erated through a Nelson and Siegel approach with few stochastic  
23 parameters, while breakeven curve paths are derived in such a  
24 way that they are correlated with nominal rates on the basis of  
25 historical correlations. Breakeven rates at different maturities are  
26 related to each other in order to give rise to an almost linear term  
27 structure with a given slope. That slope can be changed on the  
28 basis of specific assumptions regarding the inflation risk premium  
29 at different maturities.

30 Until mid-2007 this version of the model had brought about very  
31 useful results that had helped the Treasury to assess its issuance  
32 policy concerning both nominal securities and inflation-indexed  
33 bonds.  
34

35 It is still unclear whether the large financial turmoil that started  
36 in August 2007 and the recent new inflationary environment (at a  
37 world level) may have weakened the performance of the model. Its  
38 calibration with data updated through summer 2008 so far has not  
39 given clear results.

- 01           **1** The percentage target in the current (2008) guidelines is 25%, but this reflects a modification  
02           in the way the debt is measured for guideline purposes, not an intention to increase the  
03           exposure to inflation.
- 04           **2** Sweden maintains a foreign currency debt (with a target share of 15%), also based on the  
05           diversification effect of adding more debt classes to the portfolio.
- 06           **3** In the most recent period (late 2007), breakeven levels have been above the inflation target,  
07           probably reflecting to some extent that significant budget surpluses reduce the issuance of  
08           inflation-linked debt in Sweden to a very low level.
- 09           **4** There are reaction functions in the model, but they describe current policy rules regarding  
10           inflation and the budget, not how these rules would be modified in the event of a severe  
11           shock.
- 12           **5** The model is presented in an appendix to the SNDO's guideline proposal for 2007; see  
13           Swedish National Debt Office (2006).
- 14           **6** This assumption is also reasonable for a financially highly open economy and is in line  
15           with the emphasis on the diversification effects of different debt classes mentioned in the  
16           introduction.
- 17           **7** As it is hard to separate the stochastics in many financial data series from pure random  
18           walks, we also tried random walk processes for interest rates and exchange rates as a test  
19           of strategy risks in such extreme circumstances. The experiment did not lead to different  
20           conclusions compared with the autoregressive specification.
- 21           **8** The model is presented in an appendix to the SNDO's guideline proposal for 2005; see  
22           Swedish National Debt Office (2004).
- 23           **9** This growing demand can partly be accounted for by some regulatory changes regarding  
24           insurance company and pension funds (see Garcia and van Rixtel (2007)).
- 25           **10** The model assumes that inflation, the primary deficit and yield curves (the nominal and  
26           the real curves) are exogenous to the debt manager. That is, the feedback effects from debt  
27           management to the macroeconomic environment are not modelled. As long as the differences  
28           implied by the different strategies are not too large, such an assumption should not impact  
29           the assessed hierarchy of the strategies in terms of cost and risk.
- 30           **11** The choice of a quarterly frequency is accounted for by at least three reasons. Firstly, the  
31           econometric estimation of the model requires long enough series, hence ruling out the annual  
32           frequency. Secondly, the cyclical primary deficit is modelled as a function of the output gap.  
33           Therefore, and since GDP is a quarterly series, higher frequencies are ruled out. Thirdly,  
34           this frequency appears to be consistent with our problem, since the shortest maturity that is  
35           considered is a three-month one.
- 36           **12** When GDP is lower than its potential, a fiscal income deficit and a surplus of public expenses  
37           (notably due to a rise in unemployment compensations) occur. On the contrary, when the  
38           GDP is larger than its potential, a surplus of fiscal and social receipts, as well as lower  
39           expenses are observed. This is known as the automatic stabiliser.
- 13** The constant parameters entering the last equation, namely  $\tau$  and  $\beta_2$ , are obtained in  
          order to minimise the squared errors along the yield curve, using monthly data spanning  
          1991M12–2007M4. This explains 98% (on average) of the variance of 12 benchmarks yields  
          for maturities ranging from three months to 30 years.
- 14** The inflation expectations are consistent with the core model that is used (VaR or MSVaR).
- 15** Empirical estimates span quite a wide range, from 10bp (Hördahl and Vestin 2005) to 220bp  
          (Foresi *et al* 1997). Our base scenario involves a constant value of 20bp for the risk premium,  
          which is consistent with the results of Capiello and Guéné (2005) who studied French long-  
          term bonds over the period 1985–2003.

- 01 16 The idea is that when an inflation-linked bond matures, it is replaced by a bond having the  
02 same features for an amount equal to the nominal of the bond, and the remaining capital  
(equal to the inflation accrual) is replaced by a combination of bonds reflecting  $\alpha$ .
- 03 17 At the end of 2006, the share of inflation indexed debt (in French government negotiable debt  
04 outstanding) was around 13% and the average maturity was seven years.
- 05 18 More precisely, the cost-at-risk is computed here as the lower bound of the interest payment  
06 (or deficit) obtained in the worst 10% scenarios.
- 07 19 For instance, consider a financing strategy whose implementation results in smooth but  
08 sweeping debt services over time: such a strategy is a safe strategy if one is concerned about  
09 year-to-year variability, and a risky strategy if one is concerned about the probability that the  
debt service reaches a concerning level in a given number of years.
- 10 20 The simulations have also been carried out with a 10bp inflation risk premium. The results  
11 were qualitatively the same but naturally the (government) saving associated with an  
increase in inflation-indexed debt is approximately divided by two.
- 12 21 There is a very limited effect on the variability of interest payments when variability is  
13 measured by the cost-at-risk and a little decrease in cost-at-risk applied to budget balance. In  
14 the MSVAR case, for instance, increasing the share of inflation-linked debt from 0% to 40%  
yields a decrease in the budget balance cost-at-risk of less than 0.04% of GDP (versus 0.05%  
15 regarding the budget balance cost-at-risk when the core model is a VaR).
- 16 22 Furthermore, it can be noted that a two-year decrease of the average debt maturity (from 7.5  
17 to 5.5 years) reduces average annual interest payments by about 0.15% of GDP but yields  
18 a 50% rise in interest payment volatility and an increase in the interest payment cost-at-risk  
of about 0.10% of GDP in the VAR case and 0.03% of GDP in the MSVAR case. While the  
19 decrease in cost obviously comes from the positive average slope of the yield curve, the rise  
in risk can be accounted for by two phenomena: firstly, the refinancing risk is larger when  
20 more short-term bonds – which have to be refinanced more often – are issued and secondly,  
shorter interest rates are more volatile than longer ones. Meanwhile, the same change in  
21 average debt maturity results in slight decreases in budget balance variability measures.
- 22 23 For the details of the model please see Amado *et al* (2004). Over time, as mentioned also in  
23 text, the model has undergone some major refinements as the generation of yield curves is  
24 concerned. Therefore, a new version of the paper will be issued in the near future.

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